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Recent research on the study of armed actors1 has generated 
important new insights into the existence, behavior, and vio-
lent consequences of rebel organizations (e.g., Cunningham 
et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson, 
2012) and armed pro-government groups (e.g., Ahram, 
2011; Carey et al. 2013; Clayton and Thomson, 2016; Eck, 
2015; Jentzsch et al., 2015). This important new approach 
towards carefully studying armed actors currently faces two 
limitations. First, rebel groups and pro-government militias 
are frequently conceptualized as a dichotomy, which fails to 
match group complexities on the ground (Otto, 2018; 
Staniland, 2017). Many contemporary wars feature groups 
that do not take sides, but nevertheless significantly influ-
ence conflict dynamics and outcomes (Barter, 2013). 
Second, quantitative analyses of civil conflict frequently 
assume fixed group relationships vis-à-vis the state. In real-
ity, however, such relationships are often fluid and shifting. 
Qualitative studies underline how interactions between 
armed groups and the state can change from hostile 
confrontations to close collaboration (e.g., Christia, 2012; 
Day and Reno, 2014; Staniland, 2017, 2012). While research 
has started to explore when and why armed groups transi-
tion between fighting and supporting the government for 
selected conflicts (Johnston, 2007; Seymour, 2014), 
researchers lack the data necessary to uncover the shifting 
nature of group cooperation and hostility across conflicts.
This article introduces the Government and Armed Actors 
Relations Dataset (GAARD), intended to support research-
ers in overcoming the two outlined challenges. GAARD 
offers a comprehensive view on the possible shifts in align-
ments of armed groups. For instance, a group may start out as 
independent vigilantes without state cooperation, then 
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become a pro-government militia, and may then switch sides 
and fight the government as a rebel group. To capture such 
changes, GAARD builds on the concept of group alignment, 
which focuses on the relationship between non-state armed 
actors and the government. The dataset distinguishes between 
pro-government, anti-government, and unaligned armed 
groups. GAARD tracks all major armed groups involved in 
civil conflict between 1989 and 2007, including each group’s 
history of alignment with the government as well as the 
nature of the alignment changes across time. It therefore pro-
vides a dynamic account of all major armed groups’ align-
ments across time and space.
Scope of GAARD
Major armed groups
In line with other datasets (e.g., Braithwaite and Cunningham, 
2020; Cohen and Nordås, 2014), GAARD builds on the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to identify armed 
groups. GAARD’s population of interest is all armed groups 
that possess weapons, have a minimum level of organization, 
exist over a certain period of time, and are not part of the 
formalized state apparatus. To overcome limitations to which 
groups can plausibly be observed or classified,2 GAARD 
captures major armed groups, defined as groups that have 
been involved in collective violence defined by UCDP’s 25 
fatality threshold. GAARD traces all major non-state armed 
actors involved in civil wars and conflict related violence.
GAARD includes 506 major armed groups and records 
their alignments and alignment changes between 1989 and 
2007. The group sample is based on the list of formally 
organized non-state armed groups recorded in the UCDP 
Actor Dataset (Version 2.1-2012). GAARD includes all 
armed actors recorded in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002), the One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck 
and Hultman, 2007), and the Non-state Conflict Dataset 
(Sundberg et al., 2012). GAARD therefore also captures 
armed groups that do not have a contested incompatibility 
with a state but are involved in conflicts with other groups.
GAARD combines and complements the UCDP Actor 
list with information from the Pro-government Militia 
Database (PGMD, Version 1, Carey et al., 2013).3 This 
allows GAARD to trace the alignments of armed groups 
and to provide cogent information on whether a group is 
pro-government, anti-government, or politically unaligned 
at any specific point in time.4 In addition, GAARD records 
for all groups the formation and termination date as well as 
the type of termination.5 The time coverage of GAARD is 
determined by the overlap of information between UCDP 
and PGMD, with the latter providing data until 2007 (Carey 
et al., 2013).6
Government–armed group alignments
Classifications of armed groups differ widely. Researchers 
distinguish between insurgents, rebel groups, militias, war-
lords, terrorists, and organized criminals (e.g., Shultz et al., 
2004; Krause and Milliken 2009, 2017). Some classify 
non-state groups according to their roles (Podder, 2013), 
targets (Schneckener, 2017), or political functions 
(Schuberth, 2015). Others focus on the groups’ goals or 
functions as liberators, separatists, reformers, warlords 
(Clapham, 1998; Reno, 2011), proxy forces (Ahram, 2011), 
death squads (Mazzei, 2009), vigilantes (Meagher, 2007), 
or counterweights (De Bruin, 2018).
While existing group taxonomies capture the variety of 
non-state armed actors, they tend to rely on non-exclusive 
categories or limit themselves to certain regions and con-
texts, reducing their usefulness for broader geographic or 
temporal comparisons (Carey and Mitchell, 2017). In addi-
tion, most taxonomies employed in large-N studies are 
static, not taking into account how actors change over time 
Figure 1. Alignment types.
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(Staniland, 2017). GAARD aims at being (a) sensitive to 
the changing alignments of armed actors, (b) parsimonious, 
and (c) amenable to large-N research.
To this end, GAARD focuses on an armed actor’s align-
ment vis-à-vis the national government. Alignment refers to 
an armed group’s visible action to support or to oppose the 
government. An alignment of a group does not have to be 
signified by formal agreement but can be delineated by a 
variety of behavioral activities (Wilkins, 2012).
We define an armed group’s alignment based on two cri-
teria (see Figure 1). The first criterion evaluates if a group 
is linked to the government, indicated by a supportive rela-
tionship between both actors. The reference point for cap-
turing the alignment(s) of an armed group is the national 
government of the country in which the group operates.7 
We follow Carey et al. (2013), who define groups as pro-
government based on specific behavior and activities such 
as sharing information, funding, equipment or training with 
the government, undertaking shared operations, and/or 
holding political office.8 Simply sharing the same enemy as 
the government, being tolerated by it, or not being opposed 
by it is not sufficient for a group to be classified as pro-
government (Carey et al., 2013: 251). When armed groups 
are linked to the government and are not part of the official 
security apparatus, GAARD classifies them as having a 
pro-government alignment.
The second criterion asks whether a group that is not 
pro-government has a contested incompatibility with the 
government—for instance, over territory and/or power 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002). We classify groups that militarily 
pursue their incompatibility with the government as having 
an anti-government alignment, signifying an opposing or 
hostile relationship between the group and the govern-
ment.9 If a contested incompatibility with the government 
is absent, GAARD categorizes a group as unaligned. Such 
armed groups are not linked to the government and have no 
contested incompatibility with the government (Barter, 
2013; Schuberth, 2015).10
Alignment changes
Focusing on alignments enables GAARD to capture fluc-
tuating relationships between armed groups and the gov-
ernment. While alignment change is a prominent concept 
in research on party politics (e.g., Miller, 1991) and inter-
national relations (e.g., Wilkins, 2012), it has received 
surprisingly little attention in the study of civil war and 
political violence. To date, there is no typology of align-
ment changes by armed non-state groups. Moreover, 
while scholars have started to scrutinize why armed 
groups alter alignments (e.g., Christia, 2012; Staniland, 
2012; Seymour, 2014), without comprehensive data, 
studies can only focus on specific alignment changes and 
are mostly restricted to small-N case comparisons. 
GAARD distinguishes between deliberate and contextual 
alignment changes. Alignment changes are assessed from 
the perspective of armed groups. GAARD assesses 
whether the armed group under study is the decisive ini-
tiator in changing its relationship towards the central 
government.
A deliberate alignment change occurs when an armed 
group collectively and intentionally changes its alignment 
with the central government during a civil conflict. In line 
with Staniland (2012: 19), a deliberate alignment change 
takes place when an armed group alters its pattern of target-
ing and operation. A contextual alignment change occurs 
when an actor other than the armed group itself causes a 
change in alignment with the government or if an armed 
group seizes power.
The categories of deliberate and contextual alignment 
changes seek to provide users with conceptual guidance. 
We recognize that the usefulness of this distinction rests on 
the specific research question at hand. GAARD therefore 
offers researchers full control over whether and how to 
aggregate the eight types that underlie deliberate and con-
textual alignment changes.
Types of deliberate changes:
1. Group joins the government side through a negoti-
ated peace agreement.
2. Group defects from a negotiated peace agreement.
3. Group switches sides in a non-formalized way.
Types of contextual changes:
1. Group’s political affiliate loses power.
2. Group’s political affiliate assumes power.
3. Group loses government support.
4. Group reaches power itself.
5. Pro-government group is removed from power.
We identify and systematically code alignments and align-
ment changes using a variety of different sources, including 
policy papers, field research reports, scientific articles and 
books, and historical sources. This triangulation of infor-
mation mitigates problems with inaccuracy or non-report-
ing, allowing GAARD to provide information on group 
alignments not contained in other datasets (Sundberg et al., 
2012: 353). Critical coding decisions were made in consul-
tation with country and conflict experts from various 
research institutions. Moreover, GAARD provides preci-
sion variables that report the solidity of information on 
each alignment change.
Finally, the scope of alignments and alignment changes cap-
tured by GAARD differs conceptually from a number of 
related phenomena such as rebel group alliances, coups, and 
military defections. We discuss these distinctions in great detail 
in Section 8 of the Codebook, Online Appendix.
Data structure and compatibility
To provide users with information at the highest possible 
resolution, GAARD’s unit of observation is the 
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group-alignment-spell. Groups without alignment changes 
occupy one observation in the dataset. In contrast, a group 
that, say, undergoes one alignment change from pro-gov-
ernment to anti-government is recorded with two observa-
tions in GAARD. The first observation captures the group’s 
pro-government alignment whereas the second observation 
records the subsequent anti-government alignment. The 
alignment change is recorded at the end of the first align-
ment spell. The start and end date of both alignment spells 
are coded on the daily level. We also provide GAARD in 
the group-alignment-year format, and users can easily 
aggregate the data to the country-year level.
GAARD is fully compatible with existing group- and 
country-level datasets on conflict and violence. GAARD 
provides UCDP and PGMD actor IDs for each armed 
group, making it fully compatible with all UCDP datasets, 
PGMD, and a variety of other data resources such as, for 
example, the Non-state Actor Dataset (Cunningham et al., 
2013), the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), 
the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset (Cohen and 
Nordås, 2014), and the Foundations of Rebel Group 
Emergence Dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). 
Users can also link GAARD to the data by Powell and 
Thyne (2011) to identify those groups recorded in GAARD 
that are involved in coups. Finally, we locate each group in 
the country it operates in and provide Gleditsch and Ward 
(1999) country codes, which allows users to merge GAARD 









































































Figure 2. Alignment trends.
Table 2. Frequency of alignment changes (1989–2007).
Groups Frequency Percentage
Without alignment change 377 74.5%












































Figure 3. Directions of alignment changes.
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with country-level indicators used in the study of armed 
conflict and state repression.
Prevalence of alignment and 
alignment changes
Table 1 highlights the variation of group alignments 
recorded in GAARD. Roughly half of all group alignments 
were anti-government, while one third were 
pro-government. Among the groups that were active 
between 1989 and 2007, 15% were unaligned vis-à-vis the 
government at some point. Unaligned armed groups thus 
form an important actor category that require further 
research with respect to their role in conflict and post-con-
flict dynamics.
Figure 2 tracks the alignments of armed groups over 
time. While the number of anti-government groups remained 
relatively stable throughout the 1990s, there is a visible 
downward trend that commenced in the late 1990s and con-
tinued through the mid-2000s. GAARD also reveals that the 
number of pro-government groups rapidly increased with 
the end of the Cold War but has remained stable since then. 
In contrast, the number of unaligned groups has steadily 
increased.11
Turning to alignment changes, Table 2 shows that almost 
75% of all armed groups featured a consistent alignment 
towards the national government. In contrast, roughly 25% 
of the groups experienced at least one alignment change 
during their lifetime. A significant share of groups thus 
changed their relationship with the national government 
during their existence. GAARD also illustrates that if 
groups experience alignment changes, they often do so 
more than once. On average, a group changed alignment 
2.8 times during the time period covered.
Figure 3 visualizes the directions in which groups change 
their alignments. The majority of alignment changes recorded 
in GAARD are groups that changed their alignment from 
anti-government to pro-government (49%). The second most 
frequent change is in the opposite direction, where pro-
government groups became anti-government (31%). A small 
number of changes are undertaken by unaligned groups 
which became pro-government (7%), and by pro-govern-
ment groups transitioning back to being unaligned (10%).
Table 3 disaggregates the types of alignment changes 
observed in the period under consideration. While we asso-
ciate the first three types with deliberate changes (about 
44% of all recorded changes) and the others with contex-
tual changes (56%), we encourage researchers to aggregate 
change types as they deem appropriate for their endeavors. 
The majority of deliberate changes are non-formalized (49 
out of 95), while the contextual alignment changes are 
more evenly distributed.
Finally, alignment changes varied by region. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, 31% armed groups changed their align-
ment at least once while 29% underwent alignment shifts 
in Asia. In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and 
Latin America, only 16% groups altered their alignment.
Alignment dynamics in Sierra Leone
To showcase the versatility of the GAARD, Figure 4 
visualizes the histories of all armed groups active in Sierra 
Leone between 1989 and 2007.12 Among the armed groups 
that existed in Sierra Leone, three were continuously pro-
government and one was anti-government. The other four 
non-state groups underwent both deliberate and contextual 
alignment changes, which illustrates the fluidity of govern-
ment–rebel group relationships.
Defectors from the Sierra Leone army founded the pro-
government Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
in 1997. In the following year, the group was pushed out of 
power—a prime example of a contextual alignment change. 
In contrast, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started 
out as an anti-government group but became aligned with 
the AFRC, therefore experiencing two contextual align-
ments. The RUF became pro-government when the AFRC 
assumed power and was again made an anti-government 
group when the AFRC was ousted in 1998. In the three sub-
sequent years, the RUF undertook three deliberate align-
ment changes. In 1999 it joined the Lomé peace agreement, 
then defected from it in 2000, and once again joined the 
Abuja agreement before being disarmed in 2002.
In contrast, the West Side Boys (WSB) experienced non-
formalized, deliberate alignment changes. Formed as an 
anti-government group, it quickly became aligned with the 
government and helped fighting the RUF when the WSB 
leader Johnny Paul Koroma became a member of the 
government-installed Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace. The WSB-government coalition broke in 2000. The 
group became anti-government and was eventually neutralized 
by British forces during “Operation Baras.”
The Kamajors group experienced two contextual align-
ment changes. Created by the government to fight the RUF 
in 1991, the group ended up on the anti-government side 
Table 3. Types of alignment changes (1989–2007).
Type of alignment change Frequency Percentage
Co-optation by the government 34 15.7%
Defecting from peace agreement 12 5.6%
Non-formalized deliberate alignment 49 22.7%
Affiliated government loses power 22 10.2%
Affiliated government assumes power 22 10.2%
Loss of support by government 16 7.4%
Reaching power 29 13.4%
Removed from power 15 6.9%
Unclear 17 7.9%
Total 216 100%
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when the RUF, together with the AFRC, seized power in 
1997. In 1998, the AFRC–RUF coalition was ousted from 
government and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah reinstalled as presi-
dent. Consequently, the Kamajors again became pro-gov-
ernment while the ARFC and RUF once more turned 
anti-government. The complex trajectories of armed groups 
in Sierra Leone demonstrate how GAARD can help ana-
lyze the dynamic behavior of armed groups.
Conclusion
The ongoing conflicts in Syria, Pakistan, or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo demonstrate the complexity of “armed 
politics” (Staniland, 2017). They not only feature a multi-
tude of actors but also armed groups that have changed 
their relations with the state. Building on significant 
advancements in research on conflict actors, this article 
introduces the Government and Armed Actors Relations 
Dataset (GAARD). GAARD provides systematic informa-
tion on the changing alignments of armed groups. Its 
nuanced coding offers scholars detailed information on 
how and when groups oscillate between being pro-govern-
ment, anti-government, or unaligned, thereby capturing the 
variability of non-state armed politics. Overall, GAARD 
highlights the large variation in alignments and alignment 
changes of armed groups around the globe.
We hope that GAARD will assist scholars in taking a 
closer look at conflict dynamics and outcomes. For instance, 
with GAARD researchers can systematically investigate 
how governments turn rebels into counter-insurgent forces 
and how alignment changes influence the escalation of vio-
lence. Moreover, pro- and anti-government groups often 
shape the paths of countries to sustainable peace. The infor-
mation provided by GAARD can be used to connect con-
flict dynamics to post-conflict outcomes and to help assess 
where conflict resolution is likely to succeed.
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Notes
 1. See, e.g., Braithwaite and Cunningham (2020); Hoover 
Green (2016).
 2. For example, little information may be available for small or 
weak groups.
 3. PGMD includes groups independent of whether they per-
petrate violence. For ensuring comparability, we carefully 
hand coded whether groups were involved in organized 
violence as defined by UCDP using qualitative information 
from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and UCDP custom-
ized reports—see codebook for more information (Online 
Appendix, codebook). A total of 45% of PGMD groups 
failed to meet the UCDP fatality threshold and are therefore 
not included in GAARD.
 4. GAARD codes “one-to-many” matches where either sev-
eral pro-government groups captured by PGMD are linked 
to an umbrella group identified by UCDP or where multi-
ple UCDP groups are matched to one pro-government group 
recorded in PGMD. In the descriptive statistics, we treat such 
one-to-many matches as separate cases.
 5. See Online Appendix, codebook for more information.
 6. Pending renewed funding, we plan to update GAARD 
through 2014 once PGMD Version 2 is released.
 7. If an armed group operates simultaneously or subsequently 
in more than one country, we code the group and its align-
ment with the government for each country that it is active in 
(see Online Appendix, codebook).
 8. Groups are classified as pro-government only if they receive 
support by the state in whose territory they operate in. This 
distinguishes GAARD from datasets capturing sponsorship 
of terrorist organizations.
 9. Groups may oppose the government through non-violent means 
but fail to reach the 25 fatality threshold. In line with UCDP 
coding rules, GAARD classifies such groups as unaligned. 
Similarly, a group that falls out with the government is only 
coded as anti-government if the subsequent struggle causes at 
least 25 fatalities. Otherwise it is classified as unaligned.
10. Unaligned actors include groups that fight against other 
armed groups or target civilians but without support from the 
government.
11. The increase in unaligned groups may reflect an increase 
in the share of observations stemming from the Non-state 
Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012).
12. We aggregated dates to the yearly level for ease of interpre-
tation. Short-term alignments are therefore not displayed. 
Each group’s yearly alignment is determined by the majority 
of days.
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